Well, according to Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American son of immigrants, this wasn’t a good idea. Rubio thinks we should “seal the border and the visa problem” and favors solving the immigration issue “by attrition.”

For those of you needing a reminder, Cubans get their own special “amnesty” of sorts, where once they make it to shore, they qualify for an expedited “legal permanent resident” status. The Cuban-Americans can thank President Johnson and the Democratic Congress, who in November of 1966, extended this welcome mat to their gente with the Cuban Adjustment Act. Immigrants from Cuba certainly have a preferential arrangement compared to their counterparts from other countries.

I find it ironic that Marco Rubio, clearly a beneficiary within the last generation of an “amnesty” program, wants to kick the ladder out from other immigrants. If you go to his campaign website, he even mentions his parents and the jobs that they worked (bartending and hotel housekeeping like many other immigrants). It is as if he’s saying, “I got mine; now I’m going to make sure that you don’t get yours.” If this is the GOP’s new Latino outreach strategy, finding candidates who are critical of Reagan’s popular immigration policy, I don’t think that they are going to make gains with other groups that don’t have the privilege of the “Cuban amnesty.”

This morning I heard this clip on YouTube, where a journalist even suggests that Obama should consider replacing Clinton as Secretary of State because of the mixed signals:

Seneca has offered this in response:

Obama is not going to boot Hillary out over the Honduras fiasco. But the cumulative unsettling evidence of this foreign policy team begins to define the Administration: actions (or pratfalls) in Latin America over the recent Colombian-US agreements on military cooperation have become muddled, the contradictions to 40 years of US policy on the Israeli settlements issue resulted in Hillary backtracking to recover, the Cuba policy was not seriously addressed before the President stumbled onto it at the US-Latin Summit last spring nor has the administration (nor the previous two administrations) ever defined Chavez as a national security threat if in fact he is, the Plan Merida to help Mexico appears to have fallen into the doldrums of policy fatigue, the corrosive effects of the Afghanistan war (“where empires go to die…”) are increasing, the Iraq pull-out has been turned over entirely to Secretary Gates. The most intriguing question is: How can an inspirational and uplifting leader on the world stage choose some of the best and the brightest of Americans to handle foreign policy fall so short too often by carelessness or lack of focus?

Since 1992 and the fall of the Soviet Union, US policy toward Latin America has been generally ‘insufficient’ or one of ‘benign neglect’.  In fact, many observers have concluded that both the Clinton and W. Bush administrations basically handed the lead on Latin policy to the Cuban American lobby in order to secure Florida, a swing state in the Presidential elections. The Summitry Process began by Clinton which some critics considered an every four year photo op and not much more. It did have two substantive themes: a hemispheric free trade area and strongly endorsing democracy by pointing out that Cuba was the only non-democratic country in the region.

After 9/11, Latin America was readily served up and all but forgotten so it seemed. At first, the Bush Administration catered to the fiercely anti-Castro sector which had strongly voted for him. In W’s second term, the policy was pretty much given to the bureaucracy to manage and handle. This disappointed many hardliners. The objective evolved to keep the region’s problems from distracting Secretary Rice from more serious and important areas of concern. The designated hitter for Latin Policy became a fourth level bureaucrat, an Assistant Secretary was left to fend for himself without much visible top cover. Obama reached the White House and Hillary Clinton was ensconced as Secretary of State after having successfully blocked Bill Richardson from the job. Admittedly, Gov. Richardson was in the midst of a brewing scandal in New Mexico. Several political and media wags noted that all the key Latin foreign policy slots have been given to Latinos. These included Dan Restrepo at the NSC, Arturo Valenzuela at State, Frank Mora at Defense and Carmen Lomellin as Ambassador to OAS. This has been applauded notably by the Latino constituency groups. The issue has become now one of policy. Does the Obama administration care about the Latin American region? Where does it stack up? The fact is that the region once again finds itself vis-a-vis the US on the back-burner. It is not on the cutting edge of foreign policy. Yet early on Obama found himself in a tussle on two issues: Cuba and Chavez.

When Obama attended the Summit of the Americas meeting in the spring in Trinidad Tobago, he ran into unexpected or unscripted situations: is the US now ready to re-admit Cuba to the OAS? The vast majority of the Hemisphere’s countries were angling to get Cuba back into the OAS. The Obama team seemed surprised and almost unprepared for this challenge. The other one was how to deal with Chavez. Obama showed class and engaged Chavez briefly but certainly in awkward photo ops. The Cuba question dogged Hillary in the June OAS ministerial in Honduras. At the eleventh hour the Obama team was able to scramble and cobble a mutually acceptable communiqué that did not re-admit Cuba but addressed the irregularity of Cuba being absent from the OAS family. Some labeled the new Administration’s performance “Bush Light.” At the same time the US Mexico relationship was steadily moving forward. Obama revealed his support of Plan Merida to enable Mexico to better take on the drug cartels which have created enormous instability. But the funding for Merida was largely held up because of bureaucratic lack of clarity and other requirements. The other US Mexico challenge is undocumented immigration. No political bravery has emanated from the White House to wrangle with this most sensitive political public policy issue. In fact, no one is able now to predict if immigration reform will be an agenda item in the first two years of the Administration. So far it seems like the Democrats have concluded that the immigration reform bill is a lose-lose situation. The post 9/11 anti-terrorist sentiment coupled with the global economic downturn has inflicted pain on the US body politic. The US public has become more reluctant if not hostile to new immigration flows. This has plainly put a crimp into Obama team’s outlook. The continuation of building the border wall and draconian Homeland Security illegal-immigrant raids on job sites have not been seen sympathetically in Latin America and among Latino audiences in this country.

The more defining moment for the Obama Administration has been the on-going Honduras ‘golpe’ or coup crisis. The Obama team initially sided with the ousted President Zelaya and declared that the sacred principles of democracy had to be adhered and respected. Hence, Zelaya’s restoration to power became the battle cry for US interests in the initial months. Five months later the Obama administration is backtracking on the defense of democratic principles. The Administration appears to have tired of the Honduran crisis. The de facto regime in Honduras dug in and used PR and propaganda cleverly. More interesting seemed to be the Administration’s inability to persuade the defacto regime to cede power. Honduras is small with no political influence, no economic power nor military might — only diplomacy is in its arsenal. The US having all these options thinks in exhausting the first three before employing diplomacy. Hence, the Hondurans readily resorted to the old small country approach to concerns: use diplomacy but follow the rules of not speaking first, do not get angry and finally if unable to resolve favorably the problem then tangle it more. In using these tactics, Honduras wore out the US. The Obama administration slowly began to show  impatience and wariness. They saw Honduras as a small pesky country becoming increasingly more annoying and troublesome on the international stage.

Finally, the US after having declared itself initially pro-restoration of Zelaya and passing the problem to the OAS and Nobel Laureate President Arias of Costa Rica to resolve saw itself being drawn back into the fray. The contentious process dragged out in the discussion of whether the ouster of the Honduran President was legal or not. It attracted Republican die-hearts who defended the coup (because of the Chavista factor against Zelaya) while the Administration and the whole international community condemned the coup as anti-democratic. Obama’s team began to see themselves politically caught between a rock and a hard place: do we support and restore a Chavista (enemy of the US ) while defending democracy? After five months, Secretary of State Clinton and her Assistant Secretary for Latin America (who was being denied confirmation as Ambassador to Brazil by the Republicans) sought to cut a deal and injected themselves finally into the process to basically extricate themselves from this tar-baby. This required an about face or a betrayal of the previous US position. This has now become most troubling in Latin America to see the young dynamic US Administration as less than gracious in this process. In fact, many pundits in and outside the US are remarking or noting that the Administration not only demonstrated confusion or ineptitude or at best a maladroit approach, but callously left most of the OAS membership holding the bag.

To shore up support and bring someone high-level from the US Administration, Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis was chosen to be the senior US participant in a so-called Verification Commission to secure the recent signed accords now being hailed as the final solution. Solis, practically unwitting or unfamiliar with the situation, was carefully choreographed by the State Department to ensure that she would stick to the diplomatic script and not become a freelancer. Hilda had been initially hailed as the most liberal member of the Obama cabinet but by the time she left Tegucigalpa she was seen as apologist for the defacto ‘golpista’ government. She now takes the hit, not Hillary. Rather clever and cynical maneuvering it was indeed. As soon as Tom Shannon, the State Department’s overseer of this whole show announced that the Hondurans no longer had to restore Zelaya to get international recognition of the upcoming elections, the defacto government felt it was off the hook and home free.  The Brazilians, who are housing Zelaya in their Embassy and waiting for his restoration, feel the US has behaved at best negligently and indifferent. The problem could have been avoided or minimize by having initially forceful high-level US leadership on the issue. The OAS  had its Secretary General and all the countries in the region had their Presidents or Prime Minister through their Foreign Ministers decry this US perfidy. The US has had a fourth-rung bureaucrat (the Assistant Secretary) in the lead.  Obama’s team failed to recognized from the beginning the limitations of the State Department if not given top White House cover. Moreover, in handing over the volatile issue in this case to the bureaucracy, it plainly did not understand that ‘diplomats seek the path of least resistance, they believe in nothing and everything to everyone’ and as bureaucrats they adhere to: never get between a bureaucrat and his/her ambitions. They mow you down….the additional factor is that while the US behaved like a world power during the Cold War: it basically ordered everyone except the Soviets to do its bidding. In Spanish it was referred to as the ‘dedazo’…now in the post Cold War-era even the tiny insignificant powers have begun to lose their fear of the US. Yet this muddle and lack of focus produce the image of a Gulliver with Lilliputians throwing ropes over his back to bring him down. The US Latino community regardless of partisan bias will feel that if this is all the Obama Administration can provide in terms of moral leadership and support for democratic ideals and most of all the lack of consistency in policy toward Latin America then a closer  look at the expectations must be undertaken. Disappointment is the only word to describe the first real test of fortitude, skill and determination in dealing with Latin America. Arturo Valenzuela the new Assistant Secretary will now have to rectify, re-define as well as need to provide the real Obama vision of the region.

If you remember, Richardson was involved in an investigation of pay-to-play in regards to donations from CDR Financial Products, which in turn was given an advisory role on state transportation bond transactions.

On another note, this week Governor Richardson has been in Cuba on a state trade mission for agricultural goods. While there, he stopped by Ernest Hemingway’s home, which is now a museum and presented a replica of a vintage telephone used by Hemingway to curators. He also said that US citizens should be able to visit cultural sites such as this one.

“There’s a link between Hemingway and the United States and Cuba, and now there’s a New Mexico link,” he said. “I think enhancing cultural and artistic and educational ties is a prelude to diplomatic and commercial ties. It always happens that way.”

“I’m for enhanced tourism travel for Americans.”

I would have to agree with Governor Richardson about enhanced travel privileges to Cuba. It would promote a greater understanding. And at this point, I don’t think we or the Cuban people gain much from the existing arrangement.

Photo Credit: Aug. 26, 2009 Govenor Richardson in former home of writer Ernest Hemingway in Cuba (AP Photo/Javier Galeano)

Different Mexican Administrations since President Echeverria in the 1970s have openly sought to court the ‘Mexicans Abroad’ and the longer established US residents and citizens of Mexican heritage in the US. Plainly, the driving motive has been to create a pro-Mexico constituency in the US.

This idea is certainly not alien to the US political landscape. Ethnic lobbies have abounded in the US since before the Civil War. Besides the English and the Scott–Irish, the Germans in the Delaware Valley of Pennsylvania were the only other European population living in the original colonies that made up the US, along with thousands of slaves and Native American tribes. So, it was in the 1840s that the great European migration to the US began with the Irish and several of other nationalities. Many came from Middle Europe including Poles, Austrians, Czech, Slovaks and Hungarians. Scandinavians and southern Europeans also began to arrive. Southern Europeans, such as Italians and Greeks, continued to migrate to the US throughout the rest of the 1800s and into the 1900s. Several of these groups formed ethnic societies and organizations reflecting their country of origin; most were initially formed around their churches and religious affiliation. Some developed into political organizations representing the ethnic group’s domestic political agenda within the US political process. These groups often sided with their country of origin’s squabbles or conflicts in Europe. Financial aid and political support were usually forthcoming from the expatriate populations living in the US. Ireland, which did not achieve independence from Britain until 1921, had scores of Irish American groups openly supporting the independence struggle against the English occupation and repression. Financial assistance to the insurgent groups back home was one example of the expatriate’s support. As soon as the Irish Americans were politically enfranchised to vote in the US they began to ‘lobby’ the US government and public for support for Ireland’s cause. This political effort lasted late into the 1900s with the support for the IRA in Northern Ireland. In the late 1800s, the Italian-Americans clamored for political support of Italian unification and recognition of Italy. Later the Italian American groups became more domestic focused and ceased to seek political support for the political process or government of Italy. With time, these movements became mostly cultural affinity groups centered on the Catholic Churches in the old Italian urban areas of the US. 

By the latter half of the 1900s, the most significant ethnic lobbies included:  the Jewish groups helping Holocaust survivors and other humanitarian needs. The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) emerged during this period as part of the pro-Israel Lobby to galvanize support in the US for the survival of the State of Israel. The motivation here is that Israel has continuously been under ‘siege’ by its Middle East neighbors. AIPAC is generally agreed to be the best financed and most influential ethnic lobbying effort in the US. The China Lobby existed prominently in the 1950s composed by a mix of prominent Chinese exiles from Communist China and influential Americans seeking to restore the old guard of Chang Kai Chek who had been displaced in 1949 by the Communist victory led by Mao Tse Tung. The fall of China to Communism was a rallying call for this lobby. These lobbying efforts also engendered an odious internal political witch hunt in the US known as McCarthyism. However, when Nixon went to China in 1972, the remnants of this lobby had ceased to exist. The Armenian-Americans’ lobbying group appears to advocate primarily support against anything that benefits Turkey. The Turks’ slaughter of millions of Armenians in the early 1900s is the driving force behind this lobby. The Greek lobby, one of the best funded groups, seeks also to deny Turkey any positive political benefit from the US. On the Cyprus division between Turks and Greeks, this lobby readily obtains effective support for the Greek Cypriots. The remarkable aspect of this lobby is the rather small number of Greek Americans (less than one million). Still another lobby, the Tibet, is primarily focused on the restoration of the Dalai Lama to his religious supremacy in Tibet, as well as liberating Tibet from Communist China. This lobby is made up of a few Tibetans but many American followers of the Dalai Lama.

The only Latin American group to have established an effective lobby in the US has been the Cuban Americans. Yet, their numbers are quite small in comparison to Mexican Americans. There are about 1.3 million Cubans in the US as opposed to 28 million Mexican Americans (out of 45 million Latinos). The reasons for the Cuban Americans’ success in organizing are varied. They fled a Communist take over of Cuba during the height of the Cold War. Hence, they were readily embraced by the US, especially among the politically conservative movement. The Cuban Americans have behaved politically like an ‘exile’ or ‘irredentist’ group, not as a traditional immigrant group. The driving force for the Cuban émigrés has been liberating Cuba from the Communist Castro regime. The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) became the most effective vehicle for keeping the heat on Castro’s Cuba. The late Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the Foundation was readily recognized by many pundits, political groups, senior government employees, and members of Congress as the most effective and successful Latino power broker in the 80’s and 90’s. No other Latino group has produced such a leader. When he visited Washington the white establishment of both parties eagerly sought him out. It was humorously described in Miami that CANF was the inverse of the AIPAC: it bought Republicans and rented Democrats. Mas Canosa reportedly noted that he wanted his Foundation to be as effective as the Israeli lobby. He reportedly admitted that he had hired two lawyers who helped the AIPAC to set up the CANF. Though their numbers were small overall, The Foundation delivered bloc votes in a key Presidential swing state, Florida, and raised significant amounts of money for politicians of both parties. The hard-fought 2000 election contest between Gore and W. Bush was the most critical. The Cuban Americans laid claim to the victory. The Cuban Americans have traditionally voted in-block for the GOP, but enough voted for Clinton and Obama to help swing a Florida victory for each of them. Hence, the strength of the Cuban American lobby has been to deliver a vital swing state in hotly contested Presidential elections. When both Clinton and Obama won the Presidency, the Cuban American Foundation in an almost bi-partisan way appears to have tilted to the winner. In 1992, it tacked to Clinton’s side and even more egregious in 1994 from a GOP point of view it backed the Democratic incumbent Governor of Florida Lawton Chiles’ successful re-election campaign against Jeb Bush, President George W. Bush’s brother. By 1998 when Governor Jeb Bush came to power, Mas Canosa had disappeared as leader because of an untimely death in 1997. The Foundation fractured and weakened with Jeb’s and GOP Congressman Cuban American Lincoln Diaz Balart’s influence. Since then, the political strength of the Cuban Americans in both domestic and foreign policy is beginning to wane.

Mexico’s attempts to help foster a Mexican American interest group or lobby in the US have met with disappointment by and large. First, any attempt to emulate the Cuban or Israeli lobby is not doable because Mexico is neither under ‘siege’ like Israel nor a ‘captive’ nation like Cuba. Yet Mexico’s current plight with organized crime and its enormous threat to the stability and well-being of the country is perhaps a good reason to explore the possibility of engaging the Mexican Americans. However, to galvanize Mexican Americans around a Mexico cause would be a monumental task.

The variety of US citizens and residents of Mexican descent makes this goal particularly onerous. The oldest established Mexican Americans are divided into those whose ancestors were here before the gringo conquest of 1848 (Tejanos, Californios and Hispanos from New Mexico and Colorado) along with those whose grand or great-grandparents came during the Mexican Revolution (1910-20). A second group came primarily in the 1940s during WWII up through the 1960s. The third group began arriving in massive numbers from the 1970s to the present. The members of the first group have largely assimilated into US society and speak English primarily. Those that belong to the second group are considered to be in transition but fairly assimilated. Whereas the more recent arrivals are less integrated and do not fully participate in the US political process. Clearly, the bounds keeping the Mexican American population’s identity together are tangled in history, language, ethnicity, religion, folklore, cuisine, music and the arts as well as being able to trace national origin to Mexico.

The descendants of many in the first group and some from the second spawned the social-civil–political activism of the 1960s and 70s called the “Chicano” movement. These Chicanos, self-identified as such, after concluding that they neither belonged to the dominant gringo culture nor to the prevailing culture of Mexico. They felt alienated by the Anglo-American ethno-centric society and the inability to relate to the country of origin of their ancestors. However, recently arrived Mexicans do not regard themselves as Chicanos but refer to the older established ones as Chicanos. Increasingly, these newer arrivals are becoming the majority.

The first two groups are the ones that are overwhelmingly US citizens and have potential political power at the ballot box. Recent studies suggest that well over twenty million Hispanics are eligible to vote, but only about 12 to 13 million are registered and well under ten million vote. These figures include all Latinos not just Mexicans. Latinos of Mexican descent comprise about 28 million of the 45 million Latinos in the US. Mexico’s political leadership in recent years has sought to reach out to the ‘brothers’ living in the north. Echeverria’s presidency openly courted the Chicano or La Raza Unida insurgent types of the 1970s. Up to this time only established Mexican American politicians like Henry B Gonzalez, Ed Roybal and Kika de La Garza had been recognized and invited to Mexico to be honored. Later, Raul Yzaguirre of the National Council of La Raza was honored as was Henry Cisneros and numerous other ‘prominent sons of Mexico’ living in the US.

Organizing a lobby-force Mexican American group that can influence the US public and the US Congress and other movers and shakers to favor or be sympathetic to Mexico’s agenda has been illusive. This would yield a more sympathetic Congressional Hispanic Caucus and more of Mexico’s agenda in the Latino advocacy groups’ efforts The recent contentious issue of immigration along with the vast numbers of undocumented Mexican citizens residing in the US has revived Mexico’s interest in helping foster pro-Mexico groups or entities in the US. Nonetheless, Mexico must be extra careful not to antagonize the American public at large by seeming to recruit Mexican Americans in a disloyal way. This will avoid a US backlash and minimize the sentiment against the lawlessness of illegal entry into the US from becoming an anti-Latino or anti Mexican expression. Moreover, the lack of passion among the targeted groups of Mexican descent derives from the fact that the Mexican political and judicial systems are largely held in contempt or disdain by these recent Mexican immigrants, as well as among the older established groups.  Mexico is largely viewed as ‘corrupt’ or ‘inept’ or ‘insensitive to its poor masses’. Moreover, many of the US Mexican descent groups feel ‘dismissed’ or ‘disdained’ by an elitist attitude detected among many in Mexico. The use of the pejorative ‘Pocho’ describes a Mexican who has abandoned the patria (the Homeland) for el Norte and no longer holds any loyalty to Mexico. This is an example of the divisiveness that exists between those who remain in Mexico and those of Mexican descent who now reside in the US. Furthermore, Mexican Americans feel that Mexico’s elite manifests gratuitous contempt in class and racial terms. In Mexico, the derogatory word “Naco” is used to describe a fellow Mexican (usually with apparent mixed white and Indian ancestry) as socially inferior. The connotation is that he or she is attempting to behave more ‘cultured’ (white) but invariably betrays his origins. Too often this word is used to describe Mexican Americans. This further undermines the less than successful attempts by Mexico to garner support in the US among its émigré population.

Yet, in many parts of the US, especially in the Chicago area, Mexico has enjoyed success in promoting links between the Mexicans abroad and their former local municipalities or states in Mexico by having people-to-people exchanges, promoting investment in the Mexican municipalities or states’ development opportunities. Many Mexican Americans were exceptionally proud to see Mexico respond with direct assistance to the Americans affected by Hurricane Katrina. Sports exchanges and Spanish language television have also helped preserve cultural links with Mexico. Mariachi music, norteño music contests, salsa replacing ketchup, art exhibits, Mexican cuisine and Corona beer have all helped improve the cultural cohesiveness in the Mexican descent community abroad.

Mexico‘s efforts to reach out to the ‘Mexicans abroad’ and those of Mexican ancestry must be approached primarily through cultural endeavors like art, music, literature, folklore studies, language, historical writings, tourism  and perhaps best of all through Mexican cuisine. Any attempt to promote political interest or support of the Mexican government will be Sisyphean. The Italian American experience should be studied as an effective example. The influential National Italian American Foundation promotes and extols the history, music, cuisine, language and general culture of Italy. It annually celebrates Cristofo Colombo day in October with a large gala event honoring all successful Italian Americans in film, music, sports, business, journalism, academia, medicine, law, politics, government and the military. The US President, his Cabinet members and scores of Congressional members, usually attend. The Italian government is always present and additionally helps to promote Italian culture and language through its Casa Dante cultural centers found in large metropolitan areas.

Mexico, as the most populous Spanish speaking country in the world, comprises the largest portion of the Hispanic population in the US. Moreover, its close proximity to the US and its NAFTA partnership nurtures an ever-growing relationship with the US. Yet, Mexico must carefully formulate a plan or strategy to reach the Mexican Americans in a more effective manner. The treatment of the immigration conundrum in the US and the building of ‘the fence’ along the border will become key issues that could engender as note above, either friction or closeness between the two countries. Mexico has ample opportunity to appeal to the Mexican Americans by approaching them as an equals and convincing these ‘Mexicans Abroad’ to help ameliorate the potential conflicts that arise between the two countries. But it must be a truly Mexican effort without the unrealistic expectation to become either an Israeli American lobby or even a Cuban American Foundation. Mexico stands to gain influence in the US political discourse, but it must first attract the cooperation and understanding of the large Mexican American community. Some of the more positive outcomes will be a more internationally aware Congressional Hispanic Caucus and more educated Latino advocacy groups.

It should be noted that the Ibero-American summits held every 12 to 18 months have competed with these hemispheric gatherings. Spain and Portugal have been the drivers for the Ibero-American process during which the King of Spain and the President of Portugal join the heads of the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries of the American continent for these more frequent encounters.

Summitry has in fact become a vital part of the Inter-American process. It is viewed by many to have effectively substituted the OAS’ (Organization of Americans States) pretension to be the regional deliberative body. The series of summits (or summitry) have enabled the region’s leaders to become more closely familiar with their fellow heads of state and offered the opportunity to establish more effective bonds. Some observers and critics surmise that this closer relationship situation has led these countries to assert themselves with more independence and allowed them to distance themselves from the US. Furthermore, after the summitry experience, the Ibero-American countries have grown to be more united in purpose and goals. The fact that they have a permanent secretariat enables the Iberics to have more focus and follow through on any agreed endeavor for the region. This is especially true for obtaining consensus on many issues and concerns on which the US has no role to play or is ignored.

The fact is that, the US created summitry is too infrequent and has no permanent secretariat. A new US President attends the first one with only three months in office. Hence, he knows hardly any of the leaders and lacks depth on the region’s concerns. It isn’t until the second one comes around, when he has been in power for at least four years, that he is ready to reap some benefit. Unfortunately, George W. Bush’s second summit, held in Argentina, was virtually high-jacked by Hugo Chavez and his ilk. The whole affair was chaotic and totally non-productive, and President Bush became the target of Chavez’s ridicule and scorn. The up and coming summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad Tobago, President Obama’s first, is suppose to focus on violence, as well as poverty and inequality.

All indicators suggest that Cuba will be a hot topic at this summit. The clamor will be for Cuba to be re-admitted to the OAS and that all economic and diplomatic isolation of the island country be abolished. Cuba is a participant in the Ibero-American summit but not in the US one. Over the past few years, the Castro brothers have bonded with the other leaders of the region and have succeeded in becoming acceptable to all except the US. If the Obama Administration does not make a move on the Cuban issue prior to the summit and Cuba becomes the focal point of discussion at this Hemispheric summit, the US will be seen as losing its footing in the process and be forced to consider seriously moving quickly to normalize its ties with Cuba or retreat to an isolated position.

Being President Obama’s first hemispheric summit where much of the process will be based on personal rapport among the leaders attending, it could turnout to be a hindrance. Yet, Obama will most likely be saved because he is not George W. Bush, and more importantly, because he is historically the first African-American President of the US, Brazil, and the entire English and French speaking Afro-Caribbean along with Venezuela and the Dominican Republic will be most interested in Obama. The Andean and Southern Cone South Americans will be equally as interested but for other reasons such as trade, security and the environment. The ‘unofficially’ anointed regional leaders: Mexico, Canada and Brazil have already met with Obama.  Observers and critics alike will be looking at this summit for body language, as well as, the pronouncements and topics of discussions in meetings. The take away will be Cuba: What next? Equally important will be the sense the leaders of Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean feel and opine about Obama. This in effect will be a closely watched ‘coming out party’ for Obama. He will be a large part of the take away besides the Cuban reintegration issue.

The bottom line is that all this Hemispheric summitry (both the US created one and the Ibero-American) has undermined US bilateral prowess and US multilateral position of power in the OAS. The substantive prospects are limited in this up-coming summit. Unfortunately, the US is almost congenitally incapable of understanding the smaller, less developed and loosely democratic in orientation countries. The US has basically four main tools or instruments in its conduct of foreign policy. To be mindful of this is most important. The first is political influence: the US has enormous influence throughout the world given its overall strength; hence when it has problem or challenge, the US flexes its political muscle. If that does not work, then the economic option is emphasized. The US as the richest country in the world possesses enormous economic underpinnings of the world economy and selectively employs different economic options like economic sanctions, trade credits, quotas, tariffs and sanitary requirements; and of course, the ultimate weapon in the economic arsenal is an embargo. The third set of options include military preponderance like patrolling, show of arms, escorting cargo and passenger ships, mobilizing ground forces as well as naval and air assets or simply calling out the marines and attacking. The fourth set of options is diplomatic. In sum, traditionally, first the US asserts itself politically, economic and militarily. And the last thing it tends to do too often is call out the diplomats to explain the political, economic and military actions taken. Diplomacy is rarely the first option for a superpower. It comes unfortunately on occasion last to justify the prior actions. Small, weak, poor countries have no political influence, scant economic power and virtually no military might. Hence, diplomacy is their first and only option. Likewise, in a summitry process diplomacy is the first and virtually the only option. Everyone is equal, but there is always the primus inter pares (first among equals). Plainly, the US is not going to this summit with a forceful attitude, and it does not seem to have a solid agenda. If it avoids substituting slogans for process or actions, then it will have gained some accomplishments among the Latin Americans, the Canadians and the Caribbean.

The US has sent Latinos/Hispanics as envoys to Mexico. The first one was John Jova in the 1970′s, a career diplomat born in Long Island of Cuban-Spanish descent. His aristocratic bearing made him most acceptable. The second one was not so fortunate. Julian Nava was chosen by Jimmy Carter towards the end of his Presidential term. Nava, a Mexican-born California college professor, became among the Mexican elites the caricature of the Pocho/Naco coming home. At times his mangled Spanish, sprinkled with Spanglish, and his sometimes maladroit demeanor made him a reason for many Mexicans to insist that sending a Gringo envoy with such a background and behavior is a manifestly insensitive effort by gringos to insult the Mexicans. Plainly, it suggests an insecurity of the Mexicans’ identity conundrum. The third one Reagan sent. John Gavin, the glamorously handsome movie star of yester-year whose mother was a high-born Mexican from Sonora cut his swath. He spoke impeccable Spanish, manifested a self-possessed élan and almost recklessly proceeded to alienate all Mexicans with a sniffy contempt not seen since Lane Wilson the execrable US envoy of the early twentieth century. Most recently W. Bush sent his Texas friend, Tony Garza, a Mexican-American from Brownsville. Garza has no patrician airs, but looked and behaved like a regular gringo. He was not revered like Jova nor disdained like Nava nor loathed like Gavin, but viewed as a light-weight but amiable friend of the First Family and who managed to romance and marry the richest woman in Latin America, a Mexican beer heiress. However, it is known in some Washington circles that Garza did deliver in the end for the Mexicans. When the Plan Merida appeared to be headed for the budget chop at OMB, Garza readily called the White House and successfully persuaded President Bush to restore the Plan Merida funding. This is the kind of envoy the Mexicans hoped that Obama would name. Instead Carlos Pascual, a former career foreign service officer (with a zen-like demeanor) has been selected but not yet given agreement  (approval or acceptance) by the Mexican Government. Pascual, a Cuban-born, Stanford/Harvard educated Hispanic achieved recognition mostly during the Clinton Presidency. He was sent to the CIS countries (former part of the Soviet Union) in the early ’90′s. He apparently has an academic concentration in Russian and related fields. Strobe Talbott, initially the State Department’s CIS head and later Deputy Secretary became aware of Pascual’s linguistic and programmatic accomplishments as a USAID development officer.  Pascual was subsequently detailed to the National Security Council to manage the Russian and CIS portfolio.

In 2000 before the Clinton Administration ended, Pascual was made Ambassador to the Ukraine. After a successful stint there, he returned in the first term of the George W. Bush Administration, and Colin Powell selected him as the first Director of the State Department’s Reconstruction Office. This office primarily focused on strengthening emerging democracies and faltering states. He later left State and the Foreign Service to replace Jim Steinberg at the Brookings Institute as Vice President International Affairs when Steinberg became head of the LBJ School at the University of Texas. Strobe Talbott had become Brookings’s President. Now in the Obama Administration Steinberg is Deputy Secretary of State (the old Talbott position). Susan Rice, also formerly at Brookings and an Obama confidante, is US Ambassador to the UN. Pascual is seen by his Brookings colleagues as a perfect fit for Mexico with his programmatic talents and his glowing accomplishments. Yet he has no Mexico or Latin American experience or connection except for being born in Cuba and may speak Spanish as good as Ukrainian. Clearly, the Brookings group promoted him into this job as a fellow member of the Institute’s guild. However, it is generally perceived that both Hillary and the White House leaped like trouts when Pascual’s name came before them with hefty recommendations from Brookings along with a Hispanic last name to boot. But the Obamites failed to appreciate the significance of a recent dust up in senior Mexican official circles caused by the public assertion or suggestion  by some high ranking US officials that Mexico was either a ‘failed state’ or fast headed towards that status. Now the selection of the former head of the ‘failed states’ bureau at State Department as the US Ambassador caused the Mexicans to scratch their heads or recoil in frustration. Hence, why did Hillary not make the scheduled announcement after she met with President Calderon? Moreover, Pascual does not have any notable direct links to President Obama. Adding to the Mexican concern is their natural distrust of Cuban Americans because of the Miami crowd’s animosity over the years towards Mexico for being the only Latin country to preserve continuously diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro. Certainly, Pascual does not appear to share the Miami Calle Ocho syndrome. Any President reserves the right to send whomever he desires to be his envoy. But the acceptance (agreement) by the receiving country has to be manifested. In this case, the US did not think this carefully through. Moreover, the Latino political leadership in Washington was either unaware of the appointment or equally ignorant of the consequences. Now the challenge for the talented Pascual, assuming he gets Mexican approval, will be to manage the disjointed Plan Merida program and be as successful as in the Ukraine. The problem will be that the Mexicans, unlike the Ukrainians, will not drop to their knees or kiss up to the US. The Ukrainians had good reason: they sought US protection from the Russians next door. Hence, their servility to the Americans was evident. The Mexicans with their historical and morbid suspicion of American intentions and actions will be harder to read, distant at times, unrelentingly independent, reluctant to be led or guided by the US…the question arises, ‘Is Pascual really a fit or a misjudgment by the Obamites and the Brookings crowd?’ He may have to choose between trying to conduct the bilateral relationship or just managing the US Plan Merida programmatic cast of thousands who will appear throughout Mexico. Sarukhan, who is already conducting the basic thrust of the bilateral relationship in Washington, will ultimately prefer having Pascual do the programmatic drudgery and he (Sarukhan) carry out the more glamorous weight of the bilateral relationship fraught with diplomatic sensitivity, sovereignty issues, political suspicions, the treatment of Mexican illegals in the US and the NAFTA political and bureaucratic thickets. Sarukhan has quickly mastered that a country knows when its relationship with the US is equal and mature. This is discernible when the bilateral relationship is conducted in Washington by the foreign country’s ambassador and not in the capital of his country with the American would-be pro-consul. The US can send as envoys retired politicians, used car salesmen, fat cat businessmen, and political party donors to countries like France, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Scandinavian countries, Japan, Spain and sometimes even to Russia and China. These countries in return send the US their top professional diplomats or statesmen to conduct the bilateral relationship directly with the White House, State Department and the myriad of US agencies in Washington. The US sends normally career diplomats as chief of mission generally to weaker, less significant countries to conduct the bilateral relationship in those countries. Mexico has joined the ranks of these more mature relationships. Hence, the US Embassy in Mexico is not as influential as in the past, but it remains a huge job.
 
Where were the Latino advocacy wags and politicos in Washington on this critical selection process? It was noted that several Latino advocacy groups were included in the pre-trip briefing dinner held for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton before she set out for Mexico. Apparently, neither the State Department’s talking heads and analysts nor the domestic Latino groups present like the National Council of La Raza added any value to the expected substantive discussion. Plainly, Mexico appears to be treated as an appendage of the domestic Latino concerns not as a foreign policy priority. The appointments of Dan Restrepo, a Colombian American to the National Security Council, Frank Mora, a Cuban American to the Defense Department’s Office on Latin America, Pascual to Mexico and the pending appointment of Arturo Valenzuela, a Chilean American to be the Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere appear to be solidifying. These selections have the Latin Americans already wondering if the Obama team is trying to address Latin America or the domestic Latino/Hispanic agenda. If it is the latter: what has been the Congressional Hispanic Caucus’ role? And the advocacy groups’ input into such selections would be most interesting to examine. This zany selection process demonstrates that the Obama team has to be more surefooted in vetting not only for qualifications and ethnicity but for political sensitivity.  Moreover, it needs to distinguish better the domestic from the foreign policy concerns. This is a classic case where a perfectly sound and qualified Latino is selected but stumbles for more nuanced and complex reasons.

Photos: Secretary Clinton in Mexico, Mexican Ambassador to US Arturo Sarukhan, and Carlos Pascual

Here is Seneca’s take on Latinos in the Foreign Policy realm, and yes, once again, it looks like we Latinos are getting the shaft.

Basically, we are not players in the foreign policy realm, except for the Cuban Americans, who have successfully shaken down both parties on Cuba policy because of Florida’s importance as an electoral pivotal state. I will be most lacerating if Richardson gets the shaft as Hillary shoves him aside. All with the white boys approving and cheering her on to snatch the Secretary of State position from Richardson. Now if Obama goes with Kerry, it will be dreadfully boring. Teresa Heinz, his Portuguese wife, will be the only spice in that picture. As for Chuck Hagel, he would be honorable and decent choice, but if Obama keeps Gates at Defense, then Hagel’s possibilities diminish with a GOPer at Defense, hence another at State would be out of order.

Hillary is the biggest threat now to Richardson. She knows that in 8 yrs she is not running as her time would have passed. The Senate now  is too small for her global-sized ego. Hence State Dept becomes her last swan song politically speaking. Do recall that the Irish mafia in the senate (Kennedy, Dodd, Kerry and Biden) successfully blocked her from VEEP. The Kennedys were treated like pariahs under Clinton as was Carter. Therefore, it will be interesting to watch Hillary get the SECSTATE and how she relates to Vice Pres Biden, who is now the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, and he would be most interested in foreign policy while Obama treats the economic crisis. I maintain that Hillary, plenty smarter than her two female predecessors, will try internationally and nationally to steal the thunder from Obama and keep her stock high world-wide with Bill at her side on SECSTATE presidential aircraft. Latin America would readily be banished from the Hillary awareness. Anything to do with the Cucaracha Circuit would be ‘slumming it’ for Hillary. She would play the female Metternich or Talleyrand or Kissinger — all with maniacally sweeping size egos along with having a Euro and Asia focused view of the world.

Albright came across as an eager cheerleader of the Clintonistas but appeared shallow in depth and Rice was perceived as being over her head at the NSC from day one and her move to State did nothing to disabuse anyone of that notion. Madeline Albright got the job because Clinton needed a woman for the job to make history. Rice got SECSTATE because she charmed W and made herself ‘indispensable.’ The rumor on Albright was that Clinton minimized or disregarded her. Rice was never any match for Rumsfeld or Cheney, and she was viewed as betraying her mentor and main promoter Brent Scowcroft and looking the other way when Powell was being eviscerated and used by the Bushies.

As for Latin America, Shultz and Baker were the last SECSTATES that even spent any notable time and made or guided policy toward the Latin region. Rice is known to avoid having to deal with the region, flees from any looming complication and has a ‘careerist’ deal with the region : meaning keep it off her desk. Remarkably, Rice appears ready to be able to waltz away relatively unscathed and bearing no responsibility for this current Administration’s epic foreign policy debacle and wreckage because being the first female NSC Director and the second African American SECSTATE seem to insulate her from any harm to her ‘celebrity’ status. Truly too many policy-makers prefer to become ‘celebrities’ not politicians. ‘Celebrity’ translates into more opportunities and lucrative secured income after office. Hence doing ‘well’ as opposed to having to do ‘good’ becomes the end game. This adds credence to the view of the outside world that Washington is a ‘Hollywood for the Ugly.’ Hardly any politicians and policy-makers are beautiful people.

Hillary Clinton supports the embargo and the status quo policy with Cuba, while John McCain is not in favor with diplomatic engagement with Raul Castro, the current president. The Clinton and McCain position is more similar, while Obama wants to keep the embargo, but favors lifting it if political prisoners are released. Obama also wants to ease travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans, allowing them to return to the island to visit family members. I think that Obama’s position of wanting to negotiate with the Cuban government is a more reasonable approach instead of taking a stand off-ish position of not even trying to ask for some of the things we would like to see. Let’s let both countries come to the table. In recent years, Cuba has offered to assist to Hurricane Katrina victims and most recently has helped out with earthquake victims in China. Cuba has had more normal relations with the rest of Latin America, why should we continue an old tired policy that isn’t even helpful to our Cuban-American brothers and sisters here in the US?